The main contributions of this paper are: (1) to analyze an authentication and key distribution protocol for mobile computing proposed by Beller, Chang and Yacobi in 1993, and reveal two problems associated with their protocol. (2) to propose a new authentication and key distribution protocol that utilizes a broadcast channel in a mobile network. A particularly interesting feature of the new proposal is that it allows the authentication of a base station by a mobile user to be conducted \at the background", which yields a very compact protocol whose total numberofmoves of information between a mobile user and a base station is only 1.5 ! Keywords Authentication, Cryptography, Key Distribution, Mobile Computing, Security
When examining security in a wireless network, a range of issues have t o b e t a k en into account. These issues include:
1. identi cation of a mobile user 2. anonymity of a mobile user (protection of identity) 3. authentication of a base station 4. security of information owing between a mobile user and a base station 5. prevention of attacks from within a base station 6. hand-over of authentication information 7. the communication cost of establishing a session key between a mobile user and a base station, which is indicated primarily by t h e t o t a l n umber and length of messages to be exchanged 8. the cost of communications between a mobile user's home domain and a foreign domain where he is currently located, as well as security requirements on the communication links between the two domains 9. the computational complexity o f a c hieving authenticity and security 10. the complexity of computations to be carried out by a mobile user's terminal which is in general much less powerful than a base station Some issues contradict one another. For instance, to prevent mobile network resources from being abused by a fraudulent user, a network relies on the identi cation/authentication of a mobile user, which generally requires the user to reveal his or her identity. On the other hand, however, a user who wishes to make anonymous communications may b e u n willing to reveal his or her identity. T w o recent articles (Brown 1995 , Wilkes 1995 survey in details many issues related to security and privacy in mobile networks.
In this extended summary, w e assume that the reader is familiar with basic concepts in cryptography, including digital signature, public-key and private-key encryption systems.
PREVIOUS PROPOSALS
A concise summary of the authentication and security protocol employed by the global system for mobile telecommunication or GSM (Rahnema 1993) can be found in (Brown 1995) . A description of the proposed security and privacy mechanism used in the cellular digital packet data (CDPD) in the US is provided in (Frankel, Herzberg, Karger, Krawczyk, Kunzinger & Yung 1995) , where potential threats and attacks to the mechanism, together with possible solutions, are also discussed. Other notable works include (Beller, Chang & Yacobi 1993) , (Aziz & Di e 1994) , (Molva, Samfat & Tsudik 1994) , and more recently, (Herzberg, Krawczyk & Tsudik 1994) , (Asokan 1994) and (Samfat, Molva & Asokan 1995) . In the full version of this paper, an outline of each of these protocols, together with a comprehensive comparison of various aspects of these protocols, will be described.
Beller-Chang-Yacobi Protocol
Among the protocols mentioned above, the one presented in (Beller et al. 1993 ) deserves special attention, as it represents one of the earliest solutions employing a combination of both private-key and public-key encryption algorithms. The protocol is based on two computationally infeasible problems: factorization and discrete logarithm. (For this reason, Beller, Chang and Yacobi call their proposal MSR+DH protocol.)
As Beller-Chang-Yacobi protocol is partially based on the Di e-Hellman public key distribution scheme (Di e & Hellman 1976) , it uses a large prime N and a generator for the multiplicative group GF(N) .
(Note: in their exposition, Beller, Chang and Yacobi also consider a more general case where N can be the product of two large primes.) Both N and are public. A mobile user m has a pair of public-secret keys (P m S m ), where P m Sm (mod N). Similarly a base station b too has a pair of public-secret keys (P b S b ), where P b S b (mod N).
As in many security solutions, the protocol further requires the existence of a trusted certi cation authority ca who issues a certi cate to each mobile user as well as each base station to certify their public keys. (See for instance (Chokhani 1994) 
where h is a one-way hash function known to the public, P m and P b are the public keys of the mobile user m and the base station b respectively, N b is the product of two large primes associated with the base station b, and similarly, N ca is the product of two large primes associated with the certi cation authority ca. While N b and N ca are made public, their prime factors must be kept secret by their respective o wners.
Finally a private key encryption algorithm is used in the protocol. One may c hoose a private key encryption algorithm from a large set of potential candidates, including DES (National Bureau of Standards 1977), IDEA (Lai 1992) , RC5 (Lai 1992) and SPEED (Zheng 1996) . In the following discussions, we assume that a private key encryption algorithm has been selected, and denote by Encrypt K (M) the encryption of a message M u n d e r a k ey K, and by Decrypt K (C) the decryption of a ciphertext C under K.
As indicated below, Beller-Chang-Yacobi protocol consists of ve (5) The protocol is aborted if the numbers fail to pass the check.
Otherwise, m sends to b two n umberse 2 and e 3 de ned by Note that in practice, a mobile user's computations are all carried out by his personal smart card and/or mobile terminal.
Problems with Beller-Chang-Yacobi Protocol
After a close examination, we h a ve i d e n ti ed two problems with Beller-Chang-Yacobi protocol. The rst problem is related to the ine ciency of the protocol, while the second is concerned with replay-attacks that can be mounted against the protocol.
As the protocol is based on public-key cryptography, a n attacker can obtain the public key, as well as its associated digital signature, of a mobile user m, namely (m P m sig ca m ). The attacker can then impersonate the mobile user and initiate the protocol with a base station b. The attacker will have no problems in successfully carrying out all the operations involved in the rst three (3) moves of the protocol, including passing the test by the base station b in the third move of the protocol. Therefore, the fourth and fth moves of the protocol must be executed in order for a base station and a genuine mobile user to con rm the consistency of their session keys. Such a 5-move protocol may be ine cient for applications in mobile computing. This section proposes an authentication and key distribution protocol based on a broadcast channel in a mobile network. This protocol is remarkably simple: it consists of only 1.5 moves.
Certi cation Authority
As in the case of Beller-Chang-Yacobi protocol, we assume that a mobile network involves a trusted certi cation authority ca which provides participants of the network, including mobile users and base stations, with public key certi cation services. We further assume that the certi cation authority employs DSS or Digital Signature Standard (National Institute of Standards and Technology 1994). An equally good candidate is a digital signature scheme by Schnorr (Schnorr 1991) . The two signature schemes are closely related to each other, and both are based on discrete logarithm over a nite eld.
DSS involves three public parameters (p q g), where
1. p is a large prime.
2. q is a (large) prime factor of p ; 1. 3. g h (p;1)=q (mod p) with h beinganinteger satisfying 1 < h < p ; 1 a n d h (p;1)=q mod p > 1. Note that g is also said to have order q mod p.
These three parameters are known to all network participants. In addition, DSS requires each user to have a pair of public-secret keys. In particular, the pair of public-secret keys of the certi cation authority ca is (y ca x ca ), where y ca g xca (mod p) and x ca is a secret numberchosen randomly from 1 q ; 1].
The pair of public-secret keys of a mobile user m, denoted by ( y m x m ), and that of a base station b, denoted by ( y b x b ), are de ned in a similar way. Now the certi cation authority ca can use DSS to create a certi cate for a participant, say a base station b, by digitally signing on a message M using x ca , where M may contain such information as certi cate serial number, validity period, the ID of b, the public key of b, the ID of ca, t h e public key of ca, etc. (See (Chokhani 1994) 
Making Use of a Broadcast Channel
Typically a mobile network uses a broadcast channel to continuously propagate from a base station to mobile users various types of control information such as synchronization parameters, available services, network time data, base station ID etc. The authentication protocol to be proposed in the following uses part of the capacity of the broadcast channel for a base station to propagate to mobile users the certi cate associated with its public key. F or simplicity, w e assume that the certi cate takes the form of cert ca b = ( b y b sig ca b ) where y b is the base station's public key, and sig ca b is the certi cation authority's digital signature on (b y b ) created using the DSS scheme. (More information on the format of a certi cate can be found in (Chokhani 1994) and (ITU 1993) .)
To keep himself abreast of the various types of network information such as synchronization data, types of services, current n e t work time, and the public key and certi cate of a base station, a mobile user (through his mobile terminal) continuously monitors the broadcast channel. In doing so, it will be able to check whether sig ca b is indeed a genuine signature of the certi cation authority ca on the base station's public information b and y b , and hence to authenticate the base station \at the background". For this reason, we s a y that this process contributes 0.5 move to the protocol.
Key Distribution and Authentication of a Mobile User
As discussed above, a mobile user can authenticate a base station \at the background". In particular, this process can be completed immediately after his mobile terminal is switched on, or he roams into a new cell, without being noticed by the mobile user. The meanings of other symbols used in c 1 and c 2 are as follows: x is a random numberfrom 1 p ; 1], denote bit-wise exclusive-or, K is a random session key, both chosen by the mobile user m, x m is the secret key, cert ca m = ( m y m s i g ca m ) is the certi cate and y m is the public key of m, while y b is the public key of the base station, T is the current network time stamp taken from the base station's broadcast channel, G is a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number generator, and nally h is a one-way hashing function such as SHS or HAVAL (Zheng, Pieprzyk & Seberry 1993) . As is the case for cert ca b , more information may be included in the certi cate cert ca m .
Note that the involvement o f T, the current network time stamp taken from the base station's broadcast channel, is to ensure the freshness of the message. Also note that the main ideas behind the formation of (c 1 c 2 ) are from , where three practical public key cryptosystems have been designed to resist against chosen ciphertext attacks.
Upon Once a shared session key is established between the mobile user and the base station, they can use the session key together with a private-key (block or stream) cryptosystem to conduct secure communications.
REMARKS
The following observations on the new proposal can be made:
1. Due to the participation of the mobile user's secret key x m in the formation of (c 1 c 2 ), the chance for an attacker to make a v alid pair (c 1 c 2 ) is negligibly small, even if the attacker has the full knowledge of y m and cert ca m . Hence successful completion of the protocol guarantees that K = K, namely, the mobile user and the base station have an identical shared key. Consequently, unlike Beller-ChangYacobi protocol, there is no need to con rm the consistency of the keys through the exchange of known messages.
2. As (c 1 c 2 ) employs network time information, replay attacks, such as the one applicable to BellerChang-Yacobi protocol, can be e ectively thwarted by limiting the valid life span of (c 1 c 2 ), say, t o a fraction of a second. 3. The proposed new protocol consists of 1.5 moves of information: 0.5 move for the authentication of a base station by a mobile user, and a single move for the authentication of the mobile user by the base station and the establishment of a session key. 4. The protocol provides anonymity of the mobile user with respect to an onlooker: as all messages exchanged between a mobile user and a base station, including the identity of the mobile user which is part of his certi cate cert ca m , are transported in their encrypted form, an outsider or onlooker cannot gure out which mobile user is communicating with the base station. 5. The protocol prevents the impersonation of a mobile user by a fraudulent base station: the messages sent from a mobile user to a base station contains enough information for the base station to authenticate the mobile user, but not enough for a fraudulent base station to masquerade the mobile user. In fact the only entity who can create a correct pair of (c 1 c 2 ) is the mobile user who knows his secrete key x m . The reader is directed to for more information on the unforgability of (c 1 c 2 ). 6. The creation of (c 1 c 2 ) can be partially pre-computed before the mobile user wishes to start a communication session. This further shortens the time required to establish a session. 7. The protocol can also be applied to networks and distributed computing where broadcast channels present.
Currently we are in the process of conducting a detailed analysis of the proposed new protocol, covering time complexity of the protocol, strategies for pre-computation by a mobile user, roaming, the procedure for a visited base station to contact the \home network" of a mobile user and other issues.
